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Article 5

NOTES ON RECENT CASES
EMPLOYMENT AND COMPENSATION OF ATTORNEYS-QueStion of Attorney's Fees is Primarily for Referee to
Determine.-Duty of fixing amount of attorney's fees in bankruptcy matters is peculiarly for the referee, and the court will
not retry the question or substitute its own judgment for that
of the referee where there is nothing to show that he did not
fairly pass on the question in view of the evidence before him,
or that there is any mistake of law. Matter of Am. Range and
Foundry Co. (D. C., Minn.), 7 Am. B. R. (N. S.) 170.
MASTER AND SERVANT.-Owner of Family Automobile Liable for Son's Negligence.-_Where a person allows his
son, who is a member of his family, to drive an automobile
which he maintains for the comfort, convenience, pleastire, entertainment, and recreation of his family, whereby the son negligently injures another in his person, fhe owner is liable; the son,
while so driving, is acting in the furtherance of the owner's
purpose, being thereby the servant of the owner. Ambrose v. Young,
130 S. E. (W. Va.) 810.
The mere fact that a son or daughter of the owner of an
automobile was driving the machine at the time of an injury
to another, and that such child was guilty of negligence contributing to the injury, does not necessarily render the owner liable for the injuries. Napierv. Pattersonet al, 196 N. W. 73 (Iowa);
Haynes v. Wilson, 128 Atl. 70 (Md.). 'In the law of torts, as a
general rule, a parent i*s not liable for the wrongful acts of his
children. In order to charge the parent with responsibility, he
must be connected in some manner with the wrongful acts.
This connection may result: eithier from the relationship of
master and servant, or principal and agent; Stickney v. Epstein,
123 Atl. 1 (Conn.); Gates v Mader, 147 N. E. 241 (Ill.); Allison
v. Bartlett et ux., 209 Pac. 863 (Wash.); or from the negligence of
the parent in entrusting the machine to an incompetent driver. Elliott v. Harding,140 N. E. 338 (Ohio).
If the machine is used in the prosecution of the owner's business, he will be liable, though he had no knowledge of the particular trip in question. And where an automobile was pur-
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chased for the pleasure of the owner's family, the "business" of
the owner in such a case i*s the furnishing of pleasure to his
family, and the driver is acting for him in the scope of his "bussiness" when driving the machine for such purpose. Linch v. Dobson
et al, 188 N. W. 227 (Neb.); Gates v. Mader, supra.
It is clear that when the machine is being run by a child
to carry other members of the family, the owner is liable in case
of an injury, on the theory that the relation of master and servant existed between him and the driver. But on the question
as to whether a child is acting in his father's business when
such child is running the car for his own pleasure, or to take
his friends for a trip, the decisions are not 'in harmony. In
some jurisdictions, the view is taken, that when an automobile is
procured for the pleasure and entertainment of the members of
his family, the "business" of the owner is the running of the
machine for their purposes, and the operation of the machine by
a member of the family is deemed within the scope of the owner's
business, though the operator is not taking other members of
the family on a trip but is using it for the pleasure of himself
and his own friends. Jones v. Cook, 123 S. E. 407 (W. Va.);
Robertson v. Aldridge et al, 116 S. E. 742 (N. C.); Stickney v.
Epstein, supra; Allison v. Bartlett et atx., supra. In other jurisdictions, however, it is held, that when a child or other member of
an owner's family uses such a vehicle solely for the entertainment of his own friends, the machine is not being used in the
scope of the owner's business, and consequently he escapes responsibility for the negligence of the driver. Myers et al v. Shipley,
116 Atl. 645 (Md.); Stumpf et ux. v. Montgomery, 226 Pac. 65
(Okla.); McGowan v. Long-wood, 136 N. E. 72 (Mass.).
"While automobiles are not inherently regarded as dangerous instrumentalities, and the owner thereof is not responsible
for the negligent use of the same, except upon the theory of the
doctrine of respondeat superior, yet there is an exception if he
entrust it to one, though not an agent or servant, who is so incompetent as to the handling of same as to convert it into a
dangerous instrumentality, and the incompetency is known to
the owner when permitting the use of the vehicle." Gardiner v.
Solomon, 75 So. 621 (Ala); Elliott v. Harding, 140 N. E. 338
(Ohio) ; Tyree v. Tudor et al, 111 S. E. 714 (N. C.)
J. C. B.

